Montana Law Review
Volume 76
Issue 1 Winter 2015

Article 5

2-1-2015

Will Uncooperative Federalism Survive NFIB?
Abigail R. Moncrieff
Boston University School of Law, amoncrieff@utexas.edu

Jonathan Dinerstein

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Health Law and Policy Commons

Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Recommended Citation
Abigail R. Moncrieff and Jonathan Dinerstein, Will Uncooperative Federalism Survive NFIB?, 76 Mont. L.
Rev. 75 (2015).
Available at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol76/iss1/5

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Montana Law Review by an authorized editor of ScholarWorks at University of Montana.
For more information, please contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.

Moncrieff and Dinerstein: Will Uncooperative Federalism Survive NFIB?
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON106.txt

unknown

Seq: 1

25-MAR-15

13:55

WILL UNCOOPERATIVE FEDERALISM SURVIVE NFIB?
Abigail R. Moncrieff & Jonathan Dinerstein*

I. INTRODUCTION
Surveying the political landscape, one might conclude that the dominant feature of modern federalism is the one that Jessica Bulman-Pozen and
Heather Gerken described in their aptly named article of five years ago,
“Uncooperative Federalism.”1 Our hyper-partisan era is one of matter-ofcourse state resistance to national programs, with Republican governors
pushing back on President Obama’s directives.
At first blush, the doctrinal landscape seems to support the political
tide. In National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius (“NFIB”),2
the Supreme Court openly facilitated states’ resistance to Obamacare’s
Medicaid expansion, holding that the statute may not require the states to
participate.3 According to the Supreme Court, the states must be free to
refuse the national government’s instruction to expand their Medicaid programs.4 This holding looks like a tremendous victory for the “uncooperative
federalism” model, ensuring that states can resist even the most significant
of the national government’s priorities without threatening their participation in existing cooperative federalism schemes.
But on closer consideration, we think NFIB’s Medicaid holding is
more likely to harm than help the era of uncooperative federalism—and
might harm federalism generally. We predict that, in the long run, the holding is likely to cause more nationalization of policy decisions and policy
administration. That might seem counterintuitive given that NFIB looks like
an aggressively pro-federalism and pro-state holding. Let us explain.
There’s not much law left that is purely states’ jurisdiction. The national government has used its expansive spending power5 to touch every
arena of modern law and policy, and its money comes with strings attached.
Through the power of the purse and the purse’s many strings, the national
government today influences how states exercise all of their traditional “po* Abigail R. Moncrieff, Peter Paul Career Development Professor and Associate Professor of
Law, Boston University School of Law. Jonathan Dinerstein, Boston University School of Law, J.D.
expected 2016.
1. Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 Yale L.J. 1256
(2009).
2. 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2608 (2012).
3. Id. at 2607–2608.
4. Id.
5. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; S.D. v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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lice powers,” including the erstwhile local realms of education,6 health,7
safety,8 and welfare.9 States today exert their influence primarily through
efforts to shape these “cooperative federalism” programs, whether they do
so cooperatively or uncooperatively, and the end result is that a startling
amount of policy administration happens in negotiation between national
and state governments.10 That is why we live in this era of uncooperative
federalism. When philosophical disagreements arise between the controlling faction in a state and the one in the national government, there are lots
of opportunities for the state to assert itself by defying national directives.
But what happens when a state, whether intentionally in the course of
active un-cooperation or innocently in the course of cooperative administration, violates a statutory condition for the receipt of national funds? Can
individuals who are harmed by the violation force state compliance? Can
the national government enforce its statute against the state? Is the state’s
violation even illegal? As it turns out, the answers to these questions are
complex and in flux, largely thanks to the Supreme Court’s ambivalence on
the deeper questions of federalism. Given the current set of doctrinal answers from two sleeper cases, Gonzaga University v. Doe11 and Douglas v.
Independent Living Center of Southern California,12 the answer seems to be
that the state has done nothing wrong when it violates a statutory spending
condition, but the national government has done something wrong if it acquiesces in the violation. The burden is thus on the national government to
enforce its statutory spending conditions, and individuals can sue the national government (but not the state government) if the national government
fails to enforce its statutes.13 But after the Court’s holding in NFIB,14 such
enforcement will be harder than it used to be (and might be occasionally
impossible) in any cooperative federalism program that uses money as the
enforcement tool.
Because of this odd set of difficulties that the Supreme Court has created, the national government might need to switch to enforcement tools
6. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002).
7. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
8. See Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
9. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-193, 110 Stat. 2105 (1996).
10. See Erin Ryan, Negotiating Federalism, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 1 (2011).
11. 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (holding that individuals may not sue heads of state agencies under 42
U.S.C. § 1983 to correct violations of federal spending conditions).
12. 132 S. Ct. 1204 (2012) (holding that individuals should sue federal agencies under the Administrative Procedure Act’s arbitrary and capricious standard when those agencies agree to fund state programs that violate statutory spending conditions).
13. See id. at 1210 (urging individuals to sue the national government under the Administrative
Procedure Act).
14. 132 S. Ct. at 2608.
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that do not raise the constitutional difficulty that NFIB identified. Within
the realm of cooperative federalism, only one other tool seems to exist:
conditional preemption. Other than money, the only enforcement tool that
the national government sometimes uses in cooperative federalism programs is a crowd-out of state administration when states fail in their enactments of national directives—like the national fallback option in Obamacare’s exchange provision.15 After NFIB, it will be safer and easier for Congress to use conditional preemption than financial penalties when enacting
or amending cooperative federalism programs. The result, however, will be
to substitute nationalization for uncooperative federalism. If a state takes its
resistance so far as to provoke a national crowd-out, it will lose the power
of the servant and any benefits that come from the federal structure.
We do not necessarily mean to criticize NFIB with this prediction. Indeed, we do not necessarily think that a shift to conditional preemption
would be bad for public policy in the United States. Our greater concern is
with the sequence of holdings in Gonzaga, Douglas, New York v. United
States,16 Printz v. United States,17 South Dakota v. Dole,18 and NFIB and
the uncomfortable position that the Supreme Court has created for both the
state and national governments. All told, the Supreme Court’s federalism
jurisprudence makes little sense and might ultimately prove self-defeating
given the Supreme Court’s stated justifications for its holdings.
II. THE SUPREME COURT’S PRE-NFIB FEDERALISM JURISPRUDENCE
In 1992, the Supreme Court began a renewed interest in federalism
limitations—a doctrinal adoption of President Reagan’s “New Federalism”—with the Justices starting to enforce constraints on national power
that had lain doctrinally dormant since the New Deal.19 The Court began
with an anti-commandeering doctrine in New York v. United States,20
progressed to a weak constraint on the commerce power in United States v.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1321 (2012) (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act).
16. 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the federal government may not simply require state legislatures to implement federal policy).
17. 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the federal government may not simply require state law
enforcement officers to implement federal policy).
18. 483 U.S. 203 (holding that the federal government may withhold federal funding from states
that refuse to comply with federal directives as long as the funding is reasonably related to the directives
and the financial inducement is not coercive).
19. See generally Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States
in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 543 (1954) (arguing
that the Supreme Court did not need to enforce federalism constraints because the states could protect
themselves); but see Lynn A. Baker & Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the Double Standard of Judicial Review, 51 Duke L.J. 75 (2001) (arguing that the Supreme Court ought to enforce federalism doctrines more strictly).
20. 505 U.S. 144.
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Lopez,21 reinforced the anti-commandeering principle in Printz v. United
States,22 and reinforced the Commerce Clause constraint in United States v.
Morrison.23
Focusing only on these holdings, the New Federalism revolution
seemed to issue a relatively clear set of rules for Congress. First, if the
national government wants to regulate something directly, it has to enforce
the law itself. It cannot require state actors to implement national policy.
Functionally, this rule requires that Congress put its money where its mouth
is, ponying up national funds to enforce national regulations, and it requires
the national government to be clear with constituents about whose policy is
whose, flashing FBI badges rather than local police badges when it arrests
citizens for violating national policies. Second, these cases hold that there
are some things that Congress may not regulate through this model of
purely national, direct regulation. Non-economic and primarily local behaviors, like carrying guns near schools,24 abusing women,25 and refusing to
buy health insurance,26 are beyond Congress’s direct regulatory jurisdiction. So far so good. The rules are not exactly simple, but they’re simple
enough.
The pre-NFIB New Federalism holdings, however, left Congress’s
Spending Power entirely intact. Most importantly, the New Deal holdings
in United States v. Butler27 and Helvering v. Davis28 survived the New Federalism’s onslaught without a scratch. In Butler, the Court invalidated a
portion of the Agricultural Advancement Act, but in the process, it issued a
critical holding for the future of American federalism: Congress’s Spending
Power is a separately enumerated power, which the national government
may use to pursue ends other than those otherwise granted to Congress in
Article I, Section 8.29 In other words, Butler held that Congress could use
its taxing and spending power to enhance the “general welfare” in ways
other than those enumerated in the rest of the Section 8 list. But the opinion
interpreted “general welfare” somewhat narrowly, keeping the spending
power relatively contained. A year later, however, came Helvering, which
held that the “discretion” to decide whether a given expenditure is for the
general welfare “belongs to Congress, unless the choice is clearly wrong, a
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

514 U.S. 549 (1995).
521 U.S. 898.
529 U.S. 598 (2002).
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566.
297 U.S. 1 (1936).
301 U.S. 619 (1937).
297 U.S. at 65–66.
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display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”30 This holding
gave Congress essentially unlimited authority to regulate through taxing
and spending. After Helvering, if Congress could get the votes to pass a
spending statute, it could regulate the subject of that statute, irrespective of
the Constitution’s apparent attempt to reserve un-enumerated substantive
powers to the states.
Given these spending power holdings, the New Federalism limitations
on Congress’s Commerce Clause authority are, functionally, requirements
that the national government do some things through taxation rather than
regulation. Because Congress can tax and spend for any purpose, the Lopez
and Morrison limitation on national regulation of non-economic and local
behaviors is a limitation of form rather than substance. Congress can still
set incentives for individual non-economic behaviors, but it can do so only
through its spending power.
Of course, there are real differences between taxation and regulation.
After Lopez, for example, the national government can levy a tax against
anyone who carries a gun near a school, which might dissuade many people
from doing so, but the FBI cannot arrest and imprison those who willingly
pay the tax for the privilege.31 Furthermore, because the Child Labor Tax
Case survived the New Deal revolution, there are meaningful limitations on
the heft of taxes and the means of administering them.32 A tax ceases to be
a tax—and becomes a regulation—if the amount of the tax drastically exceeds the cost of complying with national policy, if the tax’s trigger includes a scienter requirement, or if the national government sets up an administrative structure separate from the Internal Revenue Service to determine whether an individual must pay the tax. Nevertheless, Helvering had a
real and significant impact on national power; Article I, Section 8 no longer
contains any substantive barriers to national action.33 Whatever barriers the
Court creates under the Commerce Clause are rules of form rather than
substance.
The next piece of the doctrinal federalism puzzle is Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis34 and Dole,35 which survive NFIB, albeit with a significant
30. 301 U.S. at 640.
31. There are today, and were before Congress passed the national Gun Free School Zones Act and
Lopez was decided, many state laws against carrying guns near schools. It is only the national government that cannot regulate this issue through direct regulation.
32. See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
33. The substantive individual rights enumerated in the bill of rights and implied in the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause, of course, still constrain national power, but thanks to Fourteenth
Amendment incorporation, they also constrain state power. Those substantive barriers are not about
federalism (though federalism may be a means of protecting the same individual liberties that the substantive rights seek to protect).
34. 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
35. 483 U.S. 203.
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injury. Steward Machine and Dole, although decided five decades apart,
both held that Congress may use its expansive spending power to cajole the
states into implementing national policy. The national government may offer money to the states that is conditioned on their implementation of national dictates. In Steward Machine, the Supreme Court upheld a statutory
scheme under which states could relieve their citizens of national Social
Security taxation only by implementing an alternative and equally good unemployment scheme.36 That statute was the inverse of today’s prototypical
cooperative federalism program; it set a national regulatory default, which
took money away from the states, but then gave the states the right to opt
out of the national default by replacing the national program with
equivalents of their own.37 In Dole, the question was whether Congress
could threaten to take 5% of a state’s preexisting highway funds away from
the state if it refused to raise the legal drinking age to 21.38 Again, that
structure was not the prototypical “contract”-like39 cooperative federalism
scheme in which the national government offers money to the states that is
conditioned on their willingness to implement and enforce certain policy
details. But the Supreme Court held that Congress could threaten states with
a drop in their baseline funding as long as the drop was not so traumatic that
the states would feel compelled to avoid it.40
For our purposes, the punchline of these holdings is that Congress can
use the Spending Power not only to circumvent the Lopez and Morrison
restrictions on regulatory subjects but also to circumvent the New York and
Printz restrictions on commandeering state governments. The federal structure of national policies that New York and Printz seemed to find distasteful
is perfectly permissible as long as the national government pays the states
for their acquiescence. Importantly, this holding limits the plausible justification for an anti-commandeering doctrine because it allows some obfuscation of policy responsibility. The national government can bribe state governments to become the face of a legal regime, convincing states to flash
local police badges rather than FBI badges, as long as it pays the states to
play that role. Notably, however, Dole contained a line of dictum that became the basis for the restriction in NFIB: “Our decisions have recognized
36. 301 U.S. 548.
37. Id. at 574 (“If the taxpayer has made contributions to an unemployment fund under a state law,
he may credit such contributions against the federal tax, provided, however, that . . . the state law shall
have been certified to the Secretary of the Treasury by the Social Security Board as satisfying certain
minimum criteria.”).
38. 483 U.S. at 211.
39. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981).
40. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (“When we consider, for a moment, that all South Dakota would lose if
she adheres to her chosen course as to a suitable minimum drinking age is 5% of the funds otherwise
obtainable under specified highway grant programs, the argument as to coercion is shown to be more
rhetoric than fact.”).
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that, in some circumstances, the financial inducement offered by Congress
might be so coercive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ ”41 In other words, the states must retain a meaningful right to
refuse this role—to refuse the acceptance of actual and apparent responsibility for national policy implementation. That requirement ensures that a
state is, in fact, at least somewhat responsible for the policies it is enforcing
because the state will have made a genuine choice to play the role of the
national government’s policeman.
The final piece of the doctrinal federalism puzzle is the least wellknown and the most puzzling. The New Federalism revolution has included
two “sleeper”42 cases that limit the states’ responsibility for complying with
national policies—even after they agree to participate in cooperative federalism schemes. In the first, Gonzaga, the Supreme Court held that 42
U.S.C. § 1983—the private right of action against state officials for deprivations of federal rights—does not provide a right of action for violations of
national spending conditions unless the conditions, by their own terms, imply such a right of action.43 On its face, the Gonzaga opinion did not look
like much of a departure from the Supreme Court’s earlier opinion in Pennhurst. Pennhurst had already noted that private rights of action were not an
appropriate remedy under cooperative federalism: “In legislation enacted
pursuant to the spending power, the typical remedy for state noncompliance
with federally imposed conditions is not a private cause of action for noncompliance but rather action by the Federal Government to terminate funds
to the State.”44 But Gonzaga had a significant impact on lower courts’ practices, limiting the number of spending conditions that the lower courts allowed individuals to enforce through § 1983 suits.45 Furthermore, Gonzaga
reiterated and clarified the Supreme Court’s theory that spending conditions
are not binding on states’ behavior; they are essentially contract terms between the national and state governments, which the national government
has the power to invoke when deciding whether or not to give money to the
states.
The other sleeper case is Douglas, which addressed the same issue of
enforcing spending conditions against noncompliant states.46 That case has
41. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590).
42. Erwin Chemerinsky & Martin A. Schwarz, Section 1983 Litigation: Supreme Court Review, 19
Touro L. Rev. 625, 663 (2003) (quoting then-Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who referred to Gonzaga
University v. Doe as his “sleeper” case of the 2002 term).
43. See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 282–286 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
44. 451 U.S. at 28 (quoted in Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 280).
45. See generally Nicole Huberfeld, Bizarre Love Triangle: The Spending Clause, Section 1983,
and Medicaid Entitlements, 42 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 413, 413, 427, 451–453 (2008) (noting that lower
courts “have inconsistently and confusingly applied the Gonzaga framework.”).
46. 132 S. Ct. 1204.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2015

7

Montana Law Review, Vol. 76 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 5
\\jciprod01\productn\M\MON\76-1\MON106.txt

82

unknown

Seq: 8

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

25-MAR-15

13:55

Vol. 76

a strange and confusing procedural history, but the bottom line is that Justice Breyer, writing for the majority in what is probably a non-precedential
portion of the opinion, ended up encouraging individuals to use Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenges to compel national enforcement of
spending conditions.47 His theory is that national agencies act arbitrarily
and capriciously, in violation of their organic statutes and the APA, when
they disburse money to states despite the states’ violations of statutory conditions on funding.48 In other words, Justice Breyer wrote that the national
government is not only empowered but may be obliged, under the APA, to
enforce the terms of its contracts with the states.
These last two cases create a strange situation for uncooperative federalism. Gonzaga and its predecessors were largely responsible for allowing
states the flexibility they needed to resist national directives while still participating in federal programs—in other words, for allowing uncooperative
federalism to exist. In many of these programs, the national government has
been unwilling to use the blunt (and often perverse) instrument of withdrawing funds to bring states into line, and individual suits under § 1983
were thus, before Pennhurst and Gonzaga, the only functional mechanism
for enforcement of spending conditions. Once that mechanism all but disappeared, the states became much freer to resist national directives within cooperative federalism regimes, without much risk to their funds.
Douglas, however, creates pressure for the national government to
start using its enforcement tools to push back on states’ un-cooperation.
Justice Breyer’s opinion literally invites individuals to sue national agencies
for allowing state resistance within cooperative federalism programs and
predicts a rule under APA arbitrary and capricious review that the national
government must force states to make a choice between their money and
their principles. That rule, if it clearly emerged from APA litigation, could
have put an abrupt end to uncooperative federalism in its most extreme
form—the form that Bulman-Pozen and Gerken call “civil disobedience”49—by making the threat of losing national dollars much more credible than it has ever been in the past. But then there’s NFIB.
III. NFIB’S DOCTRINAL ROLE
NFIB complicates the picture more than clarifying it. In the first part of
the opinion, NFIB stands by the nonsensical division that has governed
Congress since Lopez or, really, since Butler: the things that Congress cannot accomplish by direct regulation, it can nevertheless accomplish through
47. Id. at 1210.
48. Id.
49. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra n. 1, at 1278.
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taxation.50 Chief Justice Roberts’s compromise to save Obamacare is the
same compromise that has facilitated national regulatory power since the
New Deal, notwithstanding the limitations that the constitutional framers
probably had in mind and that the Court has halfheartedly tried to resurrect
in the New Federalism era. Congress holds an unlimited (legal) power to
tax and spend.51
What was new in the NFIB majority was the Medicaid holding. For the
first time, the Supreme Court gave teeth to the Dole dictum that Congress’s
financial inducements might become so tempting as to “pass the point at
which ‘pressure turns into compulsion.’ ”52 By a vote of 7–2, the Court held
that the potential tie between the Medicaid expansion and the states’ preexisting Medicaid funding gave the states no choice but to accept the expansion, unduly coercing them to enact national policy.53 In other words,
the Medicaid expansion needed to be meaningfully voluntary for the states,
and by threatening states with loss of their pre-Obamacare Medicaid funding, the national government would make it too hard for states to refuse the
expansion. The Court therefore held that the Obama Administration may
not withdraw pre-existing Medicaid funds from states that refuse to expand.
This holding might seem sensible enough—if only it were a little less
far reaching and a lot more robustly theorized. The problem with the
Court’s analysis is that the move Congress made with Obamacare’s Medicaid expansion is one that it makes all the time: it changed the statutory
conditions for an existing national grant. Furthermore, even assuming the
Medicaid expansion was a new program rather than a mere amendment to
an existing one, the threat of dropping states below their preexisting baseline of national funding if they refuse to enact a new national policy was not
new; that was what the statute in Dole had done too. So what, if anything,
was unique about the Medicaid expansion? If the answer is nothing, then a
lot of current statutory spending conditions might be constitutionally unenforceable.
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion, which spoke for three Justices but represented the governing plurality, gave the following reasons for finding the
Medicaid expansion unconstitutional even though the financial punishment
at issue in Dole was not. First, he reasoned that the expansion was so different from pre-Obamacare Medicaid that it could not be considered part of
50. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2584–2601 (holding the individual mandate is not a valid exercise of
Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce or of its power to enact laws that are necessary and
proper to carry out commercial regulation but going on to conclude that the mandate is a valid tax that
Congress may constitutionally impose).
51. Its political power is a different story.
52. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590).
53. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2605–2608.
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the preexisting program.54 So far, this point fails to distinguish Dole—Chief
Justice Roberts would have to concede that, as a policy matter, expansion
Medicaid was at least as closely related to pre-expansion Medicaid as the
drinking age was to highway funding. Furthermore, Chief Justice Roberts
gave very few meaningful criteria for distinguishing an amendment to an
existing program from what he claims happened here: the creation of a new
program under the same statute as an existing program.55 What he said was
the “Medicaid expansion . . . accomplishes a shift in kind, not merely degree”56 by abandoning eligibility categories in favor of a blanket eligibility
threshold of 133% of the federal poverty line.57 He compared that change to
“[p]revious amendments to Medicaid eligibility[, which had] merely altered
and expanded the boundaries of [the existing eligibility] categories.”58
What is not clear is why the abandonment of categorical eligibility is a
change of kind rather than degree while additions of new eligibility categories, such as pregnant women (as Justice Ginsburg noted in dissent),59 is a
change of degree rather than kind. Would Chief Justice Roberts’s analysis
have gone out the window if Congress had instead amended the Medicaid
Act to say that childless adults living in or near poverty constituted a new
category of mandatory eligibility?
Chief Justice Roberts went on to say:
Under the Affordable Care Act, Medicaid is transformed into a program to
meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly population with income
below 133 percent of the poverty level. It is no longer a program to care for
the neediest among us, but rather an element of a comprehensive national plan
to provide universal health insurance coverage.60

But there are serious problems with this argument. Most importantly, many
of Obamacare’s drafters probably believe that “the entire nonelderly population with income below 133 percent of the poverty level” is, today, a
perfectly apt definition for “the neediest among us.” Also importantly,
many members of the 1965 Congress (which created Medicaid) believed
they were writing “an element of a comprehensive national plan to provide
universal health insurance coverage.” They didn’t succeed, but it’s not at all
clear that they weren’t trying. If these are the only grounds for treating the
expansion as a new program, then that treatment seems wrong; the Medicaid expansion looks like an effort to amend the prior program so that it can
54. Id. at 2604–2606.
55. Id. at 2605–2606.
56. Id. at 2605.
57. Id. at 2606.
58. Id.
59. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2631 (Ginsburg, Sotomayor, Breyer, & Kagan, JJ., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 2606 (majority).
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better achieve its original goals. In the end, Chief Justice Roberts’s first
point fails to distinguish Dole and provides tenuous (if not simply incorrect)
arguments in support of the notion that NFIB presents a Dole case rather
than a standard case of an amendment to an existing conditional grant.
The Chief Justice’s next attempt to demonstrate that expansion Medicaid is different from pre-expansion Medicaid is more successful. He noted
that Congress structured coverage differently for the expansion population
than for the preexisting population, offering a higher federal financial participation percentage and mandating lesser benefits for the expansion
group.61 These differences are more concrete reasons to believe that
Obamacare Medicaid is a different program from—and not a mere amendment to—pre-Obamacare Medicaid. Still, though, the point fails to distinguish Dole, which imposed a brand new requirement on the states, largely
unrelated to highway funding, at threat of losing preexisting funds.
Chief Justice Roberts’s second major argument is the one that mattered—the one that successfully distinguished Dole: Medicaid puts too
much money at stake.62 In Dole, the punishment for refusing to implement
the national drinking age was 5% of highway funding, which amounted to
.05% of South Dakota’s budget at the time.63 The punishment for refusing
to expand Medicaid, by contrast, was (potentially) the entire federal portions of the state’s Medicaid budget, which, as Chief Justice Roberts noted,
“accounts for over 10 percent of a State’s overall budget . . . .”64 To Chief
Justice Roberts, this level of financial inducement “is a gun to the head.”65
He concluded that such a threat “is economic dragooning that leaves States
with no real option but to acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.”66
The problem with this argument is that it puts every single Medicaid
condition—or at least every single condition that was not in the statute the
day the state joined the program—at risk of unenforceability. Withdrawal
of the national portion of a state’s Medicaid budget is the only enforcement
tool that the Medicaid Administrator has to ensure compliance with Medicaid Act conditions. If the amount of money is the problem, then all Medicaid enforcement is unconstitutional.
The most charitable (and probably correct) understanding of the Chief
Justice’s opinion is that both features need to be present for enforcement to
be unconstitutional: the national government must impose (or threaten to
impose) (1) an enormous financial penalty for (2) refusal to implement a
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
Id. at 2604.
Id.
Id.
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2604.
Id. at 2605.
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brand new policy (as distinct from an amendment to an existing policy). If
that is the right understanding of the NFIB plurality’s holding, then perhaps
the other provisions of the Medicaid Act—even the conditions that Congress added to the statute after the states opted in—are safe from constitutional attack despite their newness to the statute and despite the potential
financial gravity of their enforcement. Unfortunately, however, the Chief
Justice’s rules for what constitutes a brand new program are so unclear that
it will be hard for future courts to figure out which post-1965 statutory
amendments are constitutionally enforceable.67
The dissenters’ opinion—which added two necessary and two additional votes to the holding that the Medicaid expansion was unconstitutional—engaged in an importantly different analysis.68 First, the dissenters
thought it mattered that a given state’s citizens would have to pay for the
Medicaid expansion whether or not they agreed to join.69 Because the national portion of a state’s Medicaid program comes from the nation as a
whole, not just the citizens of the participating state, national grants to
states create a collective action problem that (eventually) coerces all states
to get with the program. As each state joins, all states’ taxes rise, until the
marginal cost of joining feels negligible.70
If this argument had been decisive, then Medicaid should have been
unconstitutional in 1965, and all of Medicaid should be unconstitutional
today. When Arizona became the last state to join the program in 1982,71 its
citizens were already paying for Medicaid programs throughout the rest of
the country. According to the dissent’s logic, Arizonans had not meaning-

67. Chief Justice Roberts explicitly declined to “ ‘fix the outermost line’ where persuasion gives
way to coercion,” leaving coercion theory quite vague. Id. at 2606 (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301
U.S. at 591).
68. See Id. at 2642–2643 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
69. Id. at 2661–2662.
70. This theory must rest on diminishing marginal returns. The actual marginal cost should be
about the same for each state to join, but by the time you are spending $7 billion per year on other states’
Medicaid programs, adding another $150 million for a program of your own might not seem so bad. See
Id. at 2604 (majority) (noting that the national government will spend $3.3 trillion from 2010 to 2019 on
Medicaid.). Our numbers are $3.3 trillion/50 for each state’s nine-year share, divided by 9 for each
state’s annual share ($7 billion). We then divided that share by 50 to figure out how much each state
pays in national taxes for a marginal state to join. This math is a rough approximation of a state average;
different states’ programs cost different amounts, both because the programs’ eligibility and benefits
differ and because the national government’s percentage share differs.
71. Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicaid: A Timeline of Key Developments, http://perma.cc/ZQF2A6MC (http://kaiserfamilyfoundation.files.wordpress.com/2008/04/5-02-13-medicaid-timeline.pdf)
(Apr. 28, 2008).
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fully avoided paying for the national policy;72 they had only avoided administering that policy within their borders.73
Fortunately, the dissenters do not seem to have taken this argument
particularly seriously. They immediately went on to say: “Whether federal
spending legislation crosses the line from enticement to coercion is often
difficult to determine, and courts should not conclude that legislation is unconstitutional on this ground unless the coercive nature of an offer is unmistakably clear.”74 Thereafter, the dissent’s analysis tracked Chief Justice
Roberts’s argument that the heft of the potential penalty was what mattered
in the case. The feature of the Medicaid expansion that made the difference
for the dissenters was the size and consequence of the financial penalty for
the failure to expand.75 Medicaid is too significant a source of states’ revenues and expenditures for the national government to threaten to take it
away.
The dissenters’ analysis, however, did not seem to include Chief Justice Roberts’s point that the expansion was a different program from preObamacare Medicaid. They seemed to believe that any threat of withdrawing national Medicaid funding would be an unconstitutionally coercive
means of enforcing compliance with national directives, whether those directives were part of the original Medicaid program or not.
As noted above, that view, if it ever carried a majority on the Court,
would make the vast majority of Medicaid Act conditions entirely impossible to enforce. There are few Medicaid conditions that individuals can enforce through § 1983 actions after Gonzaga, and the joint dissent’s constitutional analysis would forbid the Medicaid Administrator from using her one
and only enforcement tool—withdrawal of funds—to enforce conditions,
no matter how many APA suits were filed against the agency after Douglas.
IV. NFIB’S PRACTICAL CONSEQUENCE
The final vote in NFIB’s Medicaid holding is 4–3–2, with seven justices finding the mandatory Medicaid expansion unconstitutional.76 Unfortunately, however, the divided opinion leaves tremendous uncertainty as to
72. Perhaps. The math is complicated here because the national government pays for only 50–83%
of each state’s program, and the states have a fair degree of flexibility in designing their programs. 42
U.S.C. § 1396(d)(b). Medicaid therefore costs different amounts in different states, and when a state
joins, that state still takes on a large additional expenditure of its own—17–50% of an expensive program comes out of state taxes. Nevertheless, the dissent’s logic seems to imply that the cross-subsidization of states’ cooperative federalism programs through national taxation is a reason to suspect that any
“offer” of national grants to the states is fundamentally impossible for the state to avoid accepting.
73. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting).
74. Id. at 2662.
75. Id. at 2662–2668.
76. Id. at 2575 (majority).
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what made the expansion unconstitutional. The size of Medicaid and its
importance to state budgets were undoubtedly key. Does that mean that the
holding is unique to Medicaid, which is the biggest or second-biggest line
item in every state’s budget?77 Or will other programs look equally big and
important when states bring challenges in other cooperative federalism contexts?78 For future challenges, will it matter whether a condition that is being enforced is a part of the preexisting program or is, instead, a different
kind of program that has been added to the same statute? How will courts
know which new conditions are new programs and which are amendments
to existing programs? In short, the NFIB opinion is troublingly confused
and confusing.
One thing, however, is clear: for the first time in American history, the
Supreme Court has enforced a ceiling on Congress’s power to financially
induce state administration of national policy. And the certainty that this
Court—including two of its liberal appointees—is sometimes willing to enforce such a ceiling, combined with the uncertainty as to the ceiling’s
breadth and contours, will provide the states with an unusually large bargaining chip in uncooperative federalism negotiations.
This point is key. Even if the Supreme Court never again enforced its
new constraint on spending conditions, the NFIB holding, particularly combined with Justice Breyer’s Douglas suggestion to enforce spending conditions through APA litigation, could dramatically affect cooperative federalism programs. Most federal policy administration does not happen through
statutes or courts; it happens in negotiation between national and state agencies, contained entirely within the Fourth Branch.79 When a state wants to
change its Medicaid program, it approaches the national Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) with a State Plan Amendment and seeks
CMS’s blessing to move forward, with the state’s matching funds secure.80
Before NFIB, the state agent in that context knew that outright noncompliance with Medicaid Act conditions could result (even if it never actually
77. See N.A. of St. Budget Officers, State Expenditure Report: Examining Fiscal 2012-2014 State
Spending 45–52 (2014) (available at http://perma.cc/WP5K-XYA6 (http://www.nasbo.org/sites/default/
files/State%20Expenditure%20Report%20%28Fiscal%202012-2014%29S.pdf)).
78. See generally Erin Ryan, The Spending Power and Environmental Law after Sebelius, 85 U.
Colo. L. Rev. 1003 (2014); Georgina Jones Suzuki, Clearing the Air Following National Federation of
Independent Business v. Sebelius: The Clean Air Act and the Constitutionality of Highway Sanctions, 93
B.U. L. Rev. 2131, 2145 (2013); David Baake, Student Author, Federalism in the Air: Is the Clean Air
Act’s “My Way or No Highway” Provision Constitutional after NFIB v. Sebelius? 37 Harv. Envtl. L.
Rev. Online 1 (2012).
79. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra n. 1, at 1285 (dissing administrative safeguards of federalism and state power within the Fourth Branch).
80. Medicaid.gov, Medicaid State Plan Amendments, http://perma.cc/MRH2-68VR (http://medicaid
.gov/state-resource-center/medicaid-state-plan-amendments/medicaid-state-plan-amendments.html) (accessed Jan. 12, 2015).
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had resulted) in a severe financial penalty. CMS had the threat of its 42
U.S.C. § 1396c power to withdraw national money from all or part of the
state’s Medicaid program, and that possibility kept negotiations relatively
civil. After NFIB, however, a recalcitrant (or cash-strapped and desperate)
state agent could dare her national counterparts to try withdrawal of funding, threatening constitutional litigation if national bureaucrats called the
bluff. Imagine, for example, a state Medicaid administrator who wants to
cause trouble for the sitting President, or a state administrator that simply
does not have enough money to pay for rising Medicaid costs and wants to
slash the program in contravention of Medicaid Act directives. Such an administrator might be willing to push a lot harder against CMS in the shadow
of NFIB than she ever would have dared to push before the shadow was
cast. Meanwhile, CMS knows that if it does not do something to enforce
Medicaid Act requirements, it is likely to face an APA suit for arbitrarily
and capriciously approving a State Plan Amendment that violates the national statute. But what can it do? Its only enforcement tool might be unconstitutional.
In short, given the uncertain basis for NFIB’s holding, national bureaucrats will have lost a significant amount of their bargaining power in federal
administrative negotiations––at least in those programs that rely on money
for inducement and enforcement.
V. NON-FINANCIAL ENFORCEMENT?
So far, our analysis seems to indicate that NFIB has increased rather
than decreased state power in cooperative federalism programs, perhaps allowing the states even greater leverage to behave uncooperatively. They
now have a powerful threat of their own that they can use to counterbalance
the national agency’s threat of withdrawing funding: a constitutional challenge to agency action. But remember that the Supreme Court, in the same
term as NFIB, told private litigants that they could and should force national
agencies to enforce their statutes. In Douglas, Justice Breyer invited APA
litigation against CMS for its approval of a state plan that violated a provision of the Medicaid Act. If private stakeholders accept Justice Breyer’s
invitation, then national agencies will not be able to surrender under the
state bureaucrats’ threat of constitutional litigation. They will have to show
some serious attempt to force state compliance with statutory conditions,81
81. See Motor Vehs. Mfrs. Ass’n v. St. Farm Automobile Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (“Normally, an agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem,
offered an explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so
implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise.”).
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and they will not be allowed to permit the kind of uncooperative federalism
that arises from political disagreement.82
This situation could devolve quickly. A serious threat of financial enforcement from national agencies will provoke constitutional litigation
under a standard that defies simple line-drawing, but the national agencies’
failure to enforce will provoke administrative law litigation under a standard that invites judicial intermeddling. The question, then, is whether Congress could give national agencies some other enforcement tool that would
avoid NFIB’s constitutional morass. Is there another tool that Congress
could give CMS that would enable it to avoid both constitutional litigation
from states and APA litigation from private stakeholders?
Indeed, Congress seems to have exactly two mechanisms for encouraging state implementation of national policy: conditioning national
money83 and conditionally pre-empting state action with national regulation
(crowding-out state administration).84 Some cooperative programs use a
mix of these two strategies,85 but these two mechanisms appear to be the
only two in existence today. Both financial incentives and conditional preemption allow state legislators and residents to make a choice regarding
their involvement in national policy, thereby complying with the anti-com82. See Mass. v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1441–1444 (2007) (holding that political justifications for
denying a petition for rulemaking were not valid justifications under arbitrary and capricious review);
Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Mass. v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 Sup. Ct. Rev. 51
(interpreting the Court’s holding in Massachusetts v. EPA as a requirement that agencies exercise expertise rather than make policy choices based on political preference).
83. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1451, 1456b(g) (the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) suspends any
funding to states under the Act if the states fail to fulfill the actions required of them under “coastal zone
enhancement” federal grants); 42 U.S.C. § 1397aa, 1397ff(c)–(d) (the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP) withholds federal funds from states that substantially fail to follow federal standards); 42
U.S.C. § 609 (the Temporary Assistance for Needy Family (TANF) program provides specified penalty
calculations for different violations of TANF terms); 45 C.F.R. pts. 260–265 (2014) (TANF penalty
calculations).
84. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 1211, 1251, 1253, 1254 (2012) (the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation
Act (SMCRA) allows states to submit their own programs to the federal government to regulate coal
mines, but the federal government can substitute a federal program in its place if the state fails to submit
or maintain an adequate regulatory program); 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1 to 300g-3 (the Safe Drinking Water
Act (SDWA) permits states to develop their own drinking water enforcement programs but also strips
states of their regulatory power if they fail to meet federal standards); Robin Kundis Craig, Federalism
Challenges to CERCLA: An Overview, 41 Sw. L. Rev. 617, 622 (2012) (the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, & Liability Act (CERCLA) allows states to perform and regulate
environmental cleanup operations themselves, with certain conditions); 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(1)–(2),
(d)(2) (states are required to maintain federal standards under CERCLA or risk losing their regulatory
discretion).
85. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. Envtl.
L.J. 179, 192 (2005) (the Clean Water Act (CWA) grants a great deal of discretion to states to implement their own clean water regulations, provided they meet federal minimum standards); 33 U.S.C.
§§ 1256(e), 1342(c)(3) (2012) (states can lose federal funding and regulatory discretion if they fail to
meet the minimum federal standards).
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mandeering constraint,86 but the programs that rely on financial penalties
facilitate greater policy discretion for the states than those that allow conditional preemption.
Typically, if a state chooses to forgo national funding in a cooperative
federalism program, it can entirely avoid the implementation of the national
policy within its borders. Arizona’s refusal to implement Medicaid from
1965–1982, for example, meant that there was no Medicaid program operating in the state during that time, which might have been Arizonans’ goal.
Similarly, Wyoming’s willingness to suffer the 5% reduction in highway
funding allowed it to maintain a drinking age of 18 until 1988, when it
became the last state to join the National Drinking Age Act of 1984.87 Puerto Rico still enforces a drinking age of 18, choosing to forgo 10% of its
highway funding so that it can keep its preferred policy.88
By contrast, a conditional preemption mechanism does not allow the
state or its residents to avoid the existence of a national program in the
state. When the state refuses to implement the national program, the national government steps into the state’s borders to administer the program
itself. Conditional preemption thus allows the state to avoid only the responsibility for implementing a program. The state government does not get
drafted into the national government’s service, but the state’s citizens do
not avoid the imposition of national policy.
For example, consider the health insurance exchanges under Obamacare, which use a conditional preemption mechanism. The statute requires
states to establish compliant exchanges by a set date, but it provides that, if
the state refuses or fails by the deadline, then the national government will
establish an exchange on the state’s behalf.89 The thirty-four states that refused to establish their own exchanges, thus, have not kept exchanges out of
their borders.90 They have escaped the responsibility for running the exchanges and have perhaps maintained a clearer line of responsibility than
the states that are running exchanges of their own, but they have not
shielded their citizens from the national policy.
For another example, consider the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA).91 RCRA features a conditional preemption enforcement
mechanism rather than conditional funding.92 Congress sought to regulate
solid and hazardous waste through three methods: national agency enforce86. N.Y., 505 U.S. at 168.
87. Wisconsin Briefs, The Minimum Drinking Age in Wisconsin 6 (Jan. 1995) (available at http://
perma.cc/W4FQ-WETG (http://legis.wisconsin.gov/lrb/pubs/wb/95wb3.pdf)).
88. Id.
89. 42 U.S.C. § 18041.
90. King v. Burwell, 759 F.3d 358, 364 (2014).
91. Pub. L. No. 94-580, 90 Stat. 2795 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901– 6992(k)).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 6926(e).
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ment through the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), regulation
through approved state programs, and citizen suit enforcement.93 States can
regulate solid and hazardous waste under RCRA only if EPA approves their
plans.94 States that want a greater degree of control over waste management
have an incentive to create an EPA-approved plan so that they can implement Congress’s policy themselves rather than triggering the conditional
preemption provision by which the EPA takes over full implementation responsibility. But, under this scheme, no state can avoid the implementation
of some nationally-regulated waste management plan within its borders. Its
choices are between a cooperative program and a national program. It cannot avoid the policy in its entirety the way that a state could under a standard conditional grants program.
As noted above, the NFIB ruling strains Congress’s ability to condition
national funding on states’ implementation of regulatory policies. Without
clear rules for when conditional funding “passes the point at which ‘pressure turns into compulsion,’ ”95 the national government might be hesitant
to use money as the primary enforcement mechanism in future cooperative
programs, and Congress might become tempted to turn to conditional preemption even in existing cooperative programs. In short, the holding might
have a profound effect on the national government’s choices about how to
manage cooperative federalism.
That said, national agencies have occasionally been hesitant to use
their conditional preemption authority just as they have usually been hesitant to use financial penalties. Currently, for example, the EPA has authority to take direct regulatory control under the Clean Water Act (CWA) if
states fail to meet national standards.96 The EPA, however, has a lot of
practical constraints that prevent it from using this authority, including the
lack of necessary personnel to take over CWA enforcement in a state.97
Indeed, in general, state agencies are better-equipped than national agencies
93. Jason M. Levy, Conflicting Enforcement Mechanisms under RCRA: The Abstention Battleground between State Agencies and Citizen Suits, 39 Ecol. L.Q. 373, 375 (2012).
94. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 6926.
95. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co., 301 U.S. at 590).
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c)(3).
97. Fischman, supra n. 85, at 192; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative
Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” Doesn’t, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813,
869 (1998) (explaining that while the federal government has “greater capital resources . . . [and] a
comparative advantage in delivering capital-intensive services,” state governments have an advantage
“in delivery of labor-intensive services” because they serve a smaller number of people); see also
Martha Derthick, Agency under Stress: The Social Security Administration in American Government
37–46 (1990) (recounting that the Social Security Administration lacked the trained personnel to review
eligibility for applicants when California refused); James E. Krier & Edmund Ursin, Pollution and
Policy: A Case Essay on California and Federal Experience with Motor Vehicle Air Pollution,
1940–1975, 233 (1977) (summarizing the EPA’s inability to regulate drivers in California when the
state refused to implement a plan under the Clean Air Act).
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for the day-to-day administration of these complex policies. Historically,
national agencies have capitulated to state demands rather than developing
the infrastructure required to take over administrative responsibilities from
the states.98
If, however, our prediction about Douglas’s effect comes to fruition,
requiring the national government to enforce spending conditions, and if
nationalization becomes a more common enforcement mechanism in light
of NFIB, then the national government will overcome its practical obstacles
out of necessity. Congress and the national agencies will predict the need
for conditional preemption in new cooperative federalism schemes, and
they will find the resources they need to implement national programs (or
will decrease national regulation to conserve resources). Consider, for example, Medicare. The entirely national Medicare program demonstrates that
practical barriers to nationalization in Medicaid are far from insurmountable
and could, in fact, disappear if duly anticipated. Given time, the same may
be true across the catalogue of cooperative federalism programs. Furthermore, although some agencies may be loath to take on additional administrative burdens, they are certainly no more hesitant to use conditional preemption than they have been to use withdrawal of funding. Withdrawal of
funding is ultimately a perverse enforcement tool, making perfect the enemy of the good. A state that is doing some positive work along national
policy lines—while violating many national policy directives—is better
than a state that cannot afford to do anything at all.
In the end, we predict that, over a long timescale and assuming no
dramatic amendments to prevailing Supreme Court doctrine, Douglas and
NFIB will push the national government to greater use of conditional preemption for enforcing spending conditions. This result might be good for
national policy, but it will leave the states with less freedom to resist, avoid,
or influence national policy. It will, in short, end uncooperative federalism
by eliminating state involvement in states that disagree with national programs.
VI. NORMATIVE THOUGHTS
In the end, the Supreme Court’s pronouncements on federalism doctrine have created a strange set of incentives for the national government,
and the Court’s rules might push Congress and the Fourth Branch away
from financial penalties and towards their only alternative for enforcing
spending conditions: conditional preemption. Such a swing would mark a
significant blow for uncooperative federalism. When the national government withdraws funds to enforce spending conditions, the state retains
98. Fischman, supra n. 85, at 192 n. 37.
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power over the policy regime. The state might become cash-strapped or
desperate, but it is still in charge of shaping and administering policy. When
the national government uses conditional preemption, though, the state
loses all of its powers within that regime, whether those powers were fully
sovereign or not before the national takeover. The various “powers of the
servant” that Bulman-Pozen and Gerken identified disappear, and the state
reverts to a regular “outsider” in the shaping of policy.99 It still has the
power of a lobbyist, trying to convince the national government to run its
policy in particular ways, but it lacks the power of either sovereign or servant.
All of that said, there might be many advantages to this trend, should it
emerge. Uncooperative federalism has significant drawbacks, and those
drawbacks might gradually disappear if the national government starts
crowding out defiant states and mandating true cooperation from the states
that want to stay involved in federal programs. Consider the theoretical arguments of functional federalism. Functional federalism argues that the national government should be in charge when uniformity, redistribution
among states, or economies of scale are important or when the national
government needs to prevent spillovers or a race to the bottom among the
states. By contrast, the theory argues that states should be in charge when
experimentation, voice, exit, or diversity is important or when we want regulation to occur only during times of economic growth (when the states can
afford to regulate without violating their balanced budget requirements).100
Cooperative federalism allows some combining of these virtues of national
and state regulation, respectively. Under cooperative federalism programs,
the national government engages in financial redistribution among the states
and sets a regulatory floor to ensure basic uniformity, but it allows state
experimentation, diversity, voice, and exit in regulating above the floor.
The problem with uncooperative federalism—for all that it might enhance deliberation—is that it undermines the virtues of national involvement. Imagine that spending conditions in a particular program are carefully
designed to optimize the balance between national and state regulation. Imagine, that is, that the conditions are all necessary to create needed uniformity, to avoid interstate spillovers, or to prevent races to the bottom. In this
hypothetical cooperative federalism regime, there are no superfluous or gratuitous spending conditions. By hypothesis, then, each and every spending
condition is needed to counteract an incentive that the states would face in
99. See Bulman-Pozen & Gerken, supra n. 1, at 1288 (generally discussing the usefulness of cooperative federalism to make states “insiders” who can, from that position, more fully represent “outsider”
interests).
100. See generally Abigail R. Moncrieff & Eric Lee, The Positive Case for Centralization in Healthcare Regulation: The Federalism Failures of the ACA, 20 Kan. J.L. & Pub. Policy 266 (2011).
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the absence of the national statute: incentives to create inefficient dis-uniformity, to engage in a race to the bottom, or to externalize regulatory costs
onto neighboring states. That’s the idea of efficient regulation. In the era of
uncooperative federalism—in which spending condition enforcement is relatively difficult and rare—the states have had tremendous license to take
national money while continuing to regulate in ways that are, by this hypothesis, inefficient. If the national government could engage in efficient
enforcement of its efficient regulations, then cooperative federalism would
strike an impressive federalism balance.
If, however, the national government shifts to a conditional preemption
enforcement tool, then the virtues of state involvement might disappear.
Imagine again a cooperative federalism program that Congress has designed
carefully to optimize efficiency, but this time, consider the absences of national regulation. A well-designed scheme of cooperative federalism leaves
states with flexibility in those areas of the federalism program that benefit
most from experimentation, diversity, voice, and exit—the states’ strengths.
If the national government shifts from non-enforcement or financial enforcement to conditional preemption, its takeover from the states could undermine or obliterate those virtues of state involvement. Although the national government might be able to run slightly different programs in different states after a crowd-out technique of nationalization, thereby
maintaining some experimentation and diversity values, the voice value will
all but disappear. The voice advantage of state power hinges entirely on the
smallness of the governmental entity that’s in charge. If the national government is in charge in a particular state, it will be very difficult for the
state’s citizens to influence the shaping of policy.
To evaluate normatively the future that we predict will emerge from
the Supreme Court’s interventions, we would want to know whether the
cost of losing the states’ strength with respect to citizen participation and
voice will outweigh the costs that the system has been incurring from weak
enforcement of spending conditions.101 We, the authors of this article, suspect that the cost of uncooperative federalism is higher than the cost of
nationalization, so we are relatively happy with the Supreme Court’s odd
and seemingly internally contradictory set of decisions. But the normative
question is a difficult one to test empirically because it depends to some
extent on citizens’ feelings about their state and national governments.
Some citizens might be quite unhappy with the loss of voice that accompanies nationalization, whether that loss is real or merely perceived.

101. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, Cost-Benefit Federalism: Reconciling Collective Action Federalism
and Libertarian Federalism in the Obamacare Litigation and Beyond, 38 Am. J.L. & Med. 288 (2012).
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VII. CONCLUSION
In the end, the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence seems to run
contrary to its stated goals. The New Federalism era, up to and including
NFIB, creates an incentive for the national government to flex its own muscles more, not less. Maybe that result will be good for voters’ clarity and for
uniformity of national policy, but it is not good for uncooperative federalism or for states’ autonomy—the values that the Supreme Court seems to be
trying to protect.
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